

ER 3902X-87

PLEASE PASS THIS LETTER AND ITS ENCLOSURE TO MR. GATES' OFFICE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I SPOKE WITH HIS SECRETARY ON WEDNESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER, AND SHE AND HE ARE EXPECTING IT.

Thank you,

  
George A. Carver, Jr.



C-119-15



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

25 November 1987

The Honorable Robert Gates  
The Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob,

I was at the old homestead on Monday (23 November) to attend an award ceremony and reception for my former deputy in Bonn, Warren Frank. Before leaving the building, I dropped by your office to pay my respects; but you were still downtown.

On 17 November, while driving to work and half-listening to the radio, I heard a news broadcast in which a statement was attributed to Max Kampelman -- a statement that brought me up short and moved me to take pen in hand. I FAX-ed the result to the Wall Street Journal, which liked it but did not know when within the next two weeks they would have room for it. Not wanting it to be overtaken by events, I hence gave it to the Washington Times, which published it on Tuesday (the 24th). A copy of my piece, as published, is enclosed.

A just-completed conversation with my office suite-mate Jim Schlesinger prompted me to send you this piece, along with this letter. As you well know and as I hope Bill Webster fully realizes, the DCI, the Agency, and the intelligence community -- separately and in combination -- are all going to get put on a front-burner griddle and (to switch metaphors) in the middle of heavy cross fire in connection with the INF treaty's ratification process. I do not want to meddle, even less to preach, but I hope Bill understands, accepts and will insist on sticking to a distinction I tried to flag in my essay -- the critically important distinction, with respect to "arms control" treaties, between compliance monitoring and verification.

As spokesman for the Agency and the community which he heads, the DCI has a clear obligation -- one I am sure Bill will discharge brilliantly -- to advise the President, the NSC, and such other Executive Branch officers as the President directs, and to advise appropriate members of committees of Congress (some in closed session, of course) of the extent to which, and with what confidence levels, the intelligence community can monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of (in this case) the INF

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treaty. That, as I argue in my essay, is a technical intelligence judgment to which the DCI should certainly speak. For reasons my essay also advances, however, I feel very strongly that Bill -- as DCI -- should not express an opinion on whether the INF treaty is verifiable, nor should any other Agency or community spokesman.

Whether or not any given level of monitoring capability, with any given confidence level, constitutes acceptable verifiability is a political judgment, not a technical one. It is, furthermore, a judgment no DCI should make, or let himself be pressured into making.

In some cases, e.g. SALT I, this distinction is academic. There, for example, all you had to do to verify compliance was count holes, something clearly within our monitoring capabilities. The current INF treaty, however, is a horse of an entirely different color.

Bill is going to be under tremendous pressure from the White House -- probably including the Oval Office itself -- to testify, even publicly but at least in closed session, that the INF treaty is verifiable. With all due respect, I would urge him to resist this pressure, adamantly -- in the community's interests, the Agency's interests, his own interests, as DCI, and in the nation's interests. He should of course be totally candid, particularly in closed sessions or other appropriate settings, about the full range and extent of our -- i.e. the community's -- monitoring capabilities, though he should be equally candid about their limitations and ambiguities they may not be able to resolve. He should not, however, pass judgment on -- or go bail for -- the treaty's verifiability. That is a judgment which, on the evidence provided by the DCI and the community, our political leaders and masters alone should make -- not intelligence officers, even the President's principal intelligence advisor.

If you or Bill would like to discuss these or any other issues in further detail with me, or with my suite-mate, I am certainly at your disposal, and I am sure he would be as well.

I hope you have -- or, by the time you get this, have had -- a great Thanksgiving.

With best wishes and, as always, warmest regards,

Sincerely,

  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
John M. Clin Senior Fellow